CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii): Court of Appeals Establishes Criteria for Determining Whether Arbitrator Has Exceeded His Powers by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 45 
Number 1 Volume 45, October 1970, Number 1 Article 36 
December 2012 
CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii): Court of Appeals Establishes Criteria for 
Determining Whether Arbitrator Has Exceeded His Powers 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1970) "CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii): Court of Appeals Establishes Criteria for Determining 
Whether Arbitrator Has Exceeded His Powers," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 45 : No. 1 , Article 36. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol45/iss1/36 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
the court concluded that if the ten-day period is indeed a statute of
limitations, a party must be given a full ten days in which to apply for
a stay of arbitration.
A contrary decision would presumably frustrate the purpose of
permitting service by certified mail. For, to insure timely receipt, a
party would often be compelled to post his moving papers at least
three days before the ten-day period expired. Or, service by mail would
be abandoned in favor of personal delivery.
CPLR 7511(b)(1Xiii): Court of Appeals establishes criteria for de-
termining whether arbitrator has exceeded his powers.
In marked contrast to earlier hostility,220 courts have demonstrated
an extreme reluctance to interfere with the arbitral process,221 except
to scrutinize the arbitration agreement itself.2 22 Recognizing the con-
tractual right of parties to choose arbitration as the proper forum in
which to settle their disputes, 22 3 thereby waiving the substantive and
procedural law of the state,22 4 courts have been similarly hesitant in
vacating an arbitrator's award.225 Indeed, it is generally accepted that
an award cannot be vacated for errors of law or fact.226 The CPLR
reflects this approach inasmuch as the grounds for vacating an award
focus primarily on the integrity of the participants227 and the ar-
bitrator,228 rather than on the wisdom of the award. Even CPLR 7511
(b)(1)(iii), which provides for vacation if the arbitrator has exceeded
his power, has been emasculated by an earlier decision that to fall
within the ambit of this subsection, a contract must be given an irra-
tional construction by the arbitrator: one that, in effect, makes a new
contract for the parties. 229 Quite surprising, therefore, is the Court of
Appeals' decision vacating an arbitrator's award in Granite Worsted
Mills v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd.230
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In Granite, the parties had provided that the buyer was not en-
tided to consequential damages in the event of breach. In fact, damages
were limited to the difference in value on the date of delivery between
the goods specified and those actually delivered. The total price of the
goods was $984. Nevertheless, the buyer submitted a claim for $7,000
and the arbitrator awarded $3,780.51.
In vacating the award, the Court of Appeals established the rule
that where it is clear "from the face of the award itself or from an
examination of the computations made by the arbitrator that [he] has
included an element of damages specifically excluded by the con-
tract ... ,231 the award must be vacated. Since the maximum award
under the contract, even if the goods were valueless on the date of
delivery, would be $984, the Court held that the arbitrator had ex-
ceeded his power.
The dissent, reiterating the conclusion of the appellate division,232
stressed the fact that the arbitrator could have found that the clause
limiting damages was unconscionable and therefore refused to enforce
it. And, such an interpretation would not constitute a "perverse mis-
construction '23 3 since the arbitrator possessed such power, 23 4 and the
criterion on judicial review is whether the award is rational-not
whether a court would have reached a similar conclusion.23 5
Since arbitrators need not state the reasons behind their award,236
courts should be cautious in attempting to pinpoint the exact basis
for the arbitrator's decision. As pointed out by the dissenting opinion,
the courts should be guided by whether a rational construction can
be accorded the arbitrator's award. Although such an approach may
appear to be dangerous, it is a "logical outgrowth of the tendency to
make the arbitrator the judge of his own jurisdiction once validity of
the arbitration clause is determined. '23 7
The issue in Granite is yet unsettled since the Court of Appeals
has recently granted a motion for reargument.23 8 In view of the sound-
ness of the dissenting opinion, it is quite conceivable that it will pre-
vail.
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